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Abstract
This paper examines the differences between standard “cap-and-trade” emissions trading plans
and “credit” plans in which individual agents create credits by reducing emissions below a firm-
specific baseline.  The two are equivalent if the baseline is a fixed quantity, but not if the baseline
is specified as a baseline emissions ratio times current output.  In the latter case there is no
exogenous constraint on aggregate emissions.  It may be called the case of  “(ratio-based) credit
trading”.  Examples include the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol
and the Canadian Pilot Emissions Reduction Trading plan (PERT).  
Unlike the case of  cap-and-trade, the theoretical properties of ratio-based credit  trading plans are
not well known.  In the absence of a binding quantity constraint, it is even difficult to understand
how an ERC plan can generate a positive price.  This paper studies the difference between  ratio-
based credit trading and conventional  “cap-and-trade” plans in the context of a very simple
model.  It also considers how the two plans might interact if, for example, credits from a credit
plan could be applied to commitments under a quantity-based cap-and-trade plan, and applies its
findings to current plans for credit trading, including PERT and the clean development
mechanism.  
The paper demonstrates that ratio-based credit trading is more like a tax instrument than a
quantity instrument.  It shows that there is no incentive to trade in a ratio-based market in which
all firms receive baselines computed using their “business as ususal” emission ratios.  Combining 
ratio-based credit trading with  “cap-and-trade” allowance markets effectively relaxes the quantity
constraint in the cap-and-trade plan and reduces the price of traded allowances.   In the long run,
there will be no effective constraint on emissions.  
The results have strong implications for current policy.  In particular, they suggest that mixing
quantity-based and ratio-based emission trading plans is inappropriate. 
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In the standard “cap-and-trade” model of emissions trading a central authority defines a
total allowable discharge of a specified contaminant for a specified period.   This cap is divided
into individual rights (transferable discharge permits) to discharge specific amounts of the
pollutant. The permits are either auctioned by the central authority or “grandfathered” ( i.e.
distributed free of charge to polluting firms).  After the initial distribution, firms may trade the
permits freely.  In this model the aggregate quantity of emissions is constrained to a known
amount and the price of permits is determined by the intersection of the market demand curve for
permits with the vertical market supply. 
Many plans for emissions trading do not fit the textbook model of tradable discharge
permits. For example, the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol envisages a
plan where non-Annex B countries can earn emission reduction credits (ERCs) for reducing
emissions beyond the level that would normally be expected.  These ERCs could be sold to Annex
B countries, who would use them to meet their emissions requirements under the protocol.  Other
examples include various “open market” emission reduction trading plans which have been
advocated and partially implemented for  trading nitrogen oxides (NO x ) in the North American
utility generating system (PERT, 1999).
In these plans credits are created for reducing emissions below a certain baseline quantity
which is specified as a baseline emissions ratio times current output.  The baseline quantity of
emissions is conceived as the quantity of emissions that would have been created if the actual rate
of output had been produced using a baseline, standard or “business-as-usual” technology. 
Because the baseline quantity of emissions depends upon the current level of output there is no
externally imposed quantity constraint on aggregate emissions of the pollutant.
Unlike the properties of cap-and-trade plans, the theoretical properties of open market
ERC trading plans are not well known.  In the absence of a binding quantity constraint, it is even
difficult to understand how an ERC plan can generate a positive price.  The purpose of this note is2
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Ci’C i( xi, ei) ’xiC i( 1 , ei/ xi) ’xic i( ri) (1)
to lay out a very simple model of emissions reduction credit trading and to compare its outcome
to that of a standard “cap-and-trade” plan.  Our fundamental conclusion is very simple: an open
market ERC plan is equivalent to a cap-and-trade plan in which the cap increases in proportion  to
the output of the participating firms.  This has strong implications.  Specifically, ERC trading is
efficient in that it equates marginal abatement cost across firms conditional on their output levels. 
Secondly, marginal abatement cost remains approximately constant as industry output expands. 
Consequently, ERC trading is more like a tax than a quantity instrument.  Thirdly, combining an
ERC plan with a “cap-and-trade” plan effectively relaxes and eventually vitiates the quantity
constraint in the latter.  Finally, granting credits for all reductions below “business-as-usual”
technology, as is effectively proposed under the clean development mechanism, will eventually
lead to complete absence of constraints on emissions.
The remainder of this note lays out an extraordinarily simple model to support these
claims.
A First Approximation
We begin by showing that ERC and TDP trading are equivalent when the output of
participating firms is exogenously determined.   That is, for any ERC plan we can define a cap-
and-trade plan such that the two plans lead to the same emissions for each firm and that the price
of credits under ERC trading equals the price of permits under the cap-and-trade plan.  
Consider a collection of N cost-minimizing firms indexed by  .   Each firm i0[ 1 , N]
produces emissions   and output   in the ratio  . As a first approximation, let   be ei xi ri’ei/ xi xi
exogenously determined. The cost function of each firm is homogeneous of  degree one in
emissions and output and can be written as 
where unit cost of output,  , depends on the emissions ratio.  Given that output is fixed, ci’c i( ri)
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direct computation shows that 
Marginal abatement cost is assumed to fall at a decreasing rate as the emissions ratio rises,
hence
Total emissions by the i-th firm are  .  For each firm let there be an exogenously ei’rixi





conversely, a  demand for ERCs ,  , is created by operating at an emissions ratio higher than the zi
prescribed ratio.
The i-th firm minimizes the net cost of output, defined as production cost plus the cost of
any  ERCs it must purchase.  Its problem may be written
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r i( pz) xi (11)
implies that firm should adjust its emissions ratio to set marginal abatement cost equals to the
price of ERCs (provided output is positive).
Invert (6) to obtain firm i’s optimal emissions ratio as a function of the price of ERCs, 
Substituting into (4) we can define the firm’s net demand function for ERCs.
  Negative values of    denote a supply of  ERCs .  Market demand for ERCs is the sum of zi
firm demands. In the absence of banking, net demand for ERCs must be non-positive and may only
be negative if the price of ERCs is zero.
Rearranging (10) in the case of positive prices  we have simply
Equation (11) determines the equilibrium price of ERCs,  .  Given that price, each firm’s p
(
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Proposition 1.  When all output levels are fixed, emission reduction credit trading is exactly
equivalent to a cap-and-trade emissions trading plan in which each firm is allocated permits
equal to its prescribed emissions ratio times its output, and the aggregate cap is the sum of
these allocations.
Proof:   We show that the cap-and-trade plan described in the proposition also
gives rise to equation (11) and hence the results are identical.   Denote the firm’s
use of  tradable emission permits (TEPs)  by    , the initial distribution by qi

















sum of production costs and net permit purchases, solving
But this is the same problem as (5), and consequently the solutions are identical.
Figure 1 illustrates the market equilibrium.  The effective supply of TDPs,  , is the Q
S
X
quantity weighted sum of the prescribed emission ratios.  The effective demand is the quantity-
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determined by the intersection of the two curves and is identical for ERCs and TDPs.  
The key difference between cap-and-trade plan and ERC trading is that under ERC trading
the effective supply of permits increases as industry output increases.  This prevents the price from
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Proposition 2.   When output is in fixed proportions, the equilibrium price of ERCs is independent
of the output level.
Proof:  Let the output of each industry be proportional to an output index X, that is
.  Then for positive X, (11) implies that  solves  xi’wiX, ￿i p
(
z
which is independent of X.
This result is explained by  Figure 1, which  illustrates the effect of a shift in the output
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effectively rotates the demand curve about the vertical axis.  Since (13) holds, the shifts offset each
other and the price remains constant. 
The invariance of price allows us to draw an alternative representation of the market, based
on unit demand curves.  Figure 2 is drawn with emissions per unit of output on the horizontal axis. 
Figure 2(b) shows the unit emissions demand curve for an individual firm with prescribed
emissions ratio  .  These may be aggregated using output weights    to form the market r
B
i wi









The supply side of the market is represented by weighted average baseline ratio, 
 and   are the left and right sides of (13), respectively.  The equilibrium price,   is R B R D p
(
z
determined by their intersection, independently of the level of output.  
Now let us consider the efficiency of ERC trading.  Equation (7)  implies that ERC trading
leads to the equalization of marginal abatement cost across firms, thus ensuring that both open-
market ERC trading and cap-and-trade permit trading are efficient in the sense that they minimize
the cost of achieving an exogenously determined level of emissions.  The efficiency gains can be
illustrated in using the unit emissions demand curve of Figure 2(b) .  The firm chooses an











to area  a but saving area  a plus area  b in abatement cost, thus earning additional profits equal to
area  b on each unit of output.  Similar results hold for  firms for which the equilibrium emissions
ratio is less that the prescribed ratio.  These firms sell credits and reduce emissions, earning profits
equal to the difference between sales revenue and the incremental cost of abatement.
Emissions reduction credit trading and binding standards
Cap-and-trade TDP trading places a potentially binding constraint on total emissions.  If it
is binding, the market generates a positive price for permits.  If the cap exceeds the aggregate
emissions of uncontrolled firms, trading may occur but the equilibrium price of permits will be
zero.  In open-market ERC trading the prescribed emission ratios fulfil the same function.  It is
obvious from Figure 2 (b) that the price of credits will depend positively on the severity of the
average performance standard,  .   Proposition 3 establishes that the prescribed performance R B
standards must be sufficiently strict for at least one firm to exceed its standard in equilibrium.  
Otherwise the price of credits will be zero.8
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Proposition 3.   If the price under ERC trading is positive, at least one firm must be exceeding its
prescribed emissions ratio. 
Proof: If the price is strictly positive, Equation (8) and proposition (2)  imply that
.  Since the weights  are non-negative, either all unit demands are j
N
i’1
( r i( pz) &¯ri) wi’0 wi
equal to the corresponding performance ratios,    , and there is no trade, or r i( pz) ’¯ri, ￿i
there must be at least one firm for which    and one for which  . r i( pz) > ¯ri r i( pz) < ¯ri
Many discussions of open market ERC trading plans state that credits will only be given for
real and verifiable reductions which are surplus to regulatory requirements.  This may give the
impression that no firm is permitted to violate the  regulatory requirement.   Proposition 3
establishes that this is not possible in equilibrium.  A stand-alone ERC trading plan can only
generate trades if some firms are using credits to offset violations of the prescribed performance
standard.
Is ERC trading a price instrument or a quantity instrument?
We are used to thinking of emissions trading as a quantity-based  instrument for
environmental regulation, but Figure 1 suggests that emissions reduction credit trading may act
more like a tax than a quantity constraint.  Under an emissions tax, firms equate marginal
abatement cost to a tax which is independent of industry output.  Under ERC trading, firms equate
marginal abatement cost to  a constant price for ERCs that is independent of output.  In fact we
have
Proposition 4.   ERC trading is equivalent to an emissions tax   with a free base equal to the t’pz
prescribed emissions ratio times output.
Proof: This follows immediately from comparison of total cost under an emissions tax, ,
with total cost under ERCs,  . c





This suggests that the outcome of  ERC trading may differ from the outcome of emissions taxes
because of demand-side effects.  In discussing this, it is useful to compare the average costs of
output under emissions taxes, under ERC trading, and under a hypothetical command-and-control
performance standard equal to   for each firm.   We have r
B
i
Proposition 5.     Let    be the average cost of output under command-and-control with cc
performance standards equal to the prescribed emissions ratios.  Let    be the average cost cr
of output under emissions reduction credit trading with the same prescribed emissions
ratios.  Let  be the average cost of output under an emissions tax equal to the equilibrium ct
price of  credits.  Then 
(a)  . cr< ct
(b)  cr< ’cc




total cost of output under ERC trading is   , hence c
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Proposition 5(b) follows from profit maximization, since under ERC trading firms retain
the option of withdrawing from the market and producing at the command-and-control











Proposition 5 implies that once demand side effects are admitted, ERC trading and
emissions taxes will no longer be equivalent.  The model developed so far cannot accommodate a
formal comparison, but the general situation for a competitive industry comprised of firms like
firm  i is  illustrated by Figure 3.  The horizontal axis now represents industry output.  Under ERC
trading the long run  industry supply curve will be horizontal at S 2 ..  Under an equivalent tax, the
industry supply curve would shift upwards to S 1  and industry output would be lower than under
ERC trading..  Emissions ratios would be the same in the two cases, so total emissions will be10
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higher under ERC trading.   Under command-and-control regulation the long-run supply curve of
the industry output would also be higher than in the case of ERC trading.  Suppose it is at S 3 . 
Note that the relative positions of S 2  and S 3  cannot be determined..  Industry output would be
higher under ERC trading than under command-and-control.  The emissions ratio under ERC
trading will be higher than under command-and-control if the industry is a net purchaser of permits
and lower than under command-and-control if the industry is a net seller of permits.  Therefore
total emissions will be higher under ERC trading than under command and control if the industry is
a net purchaser, and total emissions may be higher, lower, or the same as in command-and-control
beecause total output and emissions ratio are moving in opposite directions.
The comparison with cap-and-trade TDP trading is more complex.  Under TDP trading the
cap is fixed and the price of permits rises as industry output expands.  If the industry is a net
purchaser of credits, the long run industry supply curve, S 4 , becomes positively sloped.  In the
initial equilibrium ERC trading and emissions trading are equivalent, but if demand shifts to the
right industry price will rise and  industry output will expand less rapidly under cap-and-trade
emissions trading.  Interestingly, the reverse seems to be true for an industry that is a net  supplier 
of permits.  For emissions trading in such an industry the long run supply price will  decline as
output increases, because the increased demand for permits will drive up their price, leading to
greater average revenue from sales of permits.  The long run industry supply curve is negatively
sloped.  Under emissions trading, the rise in permit prices due to an increase in industry demand
for output will cause the industry’s emission ratio to fall,  rendering the effect on industry




Combining ERCs and Emissions Trading
Many proposals for emissions trading imply combining a “cap-and-trade” system with an
open-market system.  One example is Ontario Hydro’s plan to use emission reduction credits
generated under the Pilot Emissions Reduction Trading Program (PERT) to meet its voluntary cap
of 38,000 tonnes  of NOx emissions in the year 2000 (Ontario Hydro, 1998, p.95)  and proposals
for combining certified emission reduction credits generated under the Clean Development
Mechanism with Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.   In the short run,
such combined plans can generate trades at  positive prices.  In the long run, the price of ERCs in
the open market will dominate.
To illustrate this, suppose there are two groups of firms, A and B, operating in separate
emissions trading and ERC trading markets, respectively. Return to the case  in which output is
exogenously fixed..  We adopt a standard diagram from the literature.  Figure 4 (a) illustrates the
situation when a cap-and-trade system and an ERC trading system operate independently.   The
cap in the quantity controlled group of firms is Q A , and the corresponding price of permits is p A . 
The effective supply of ERCs , given the output of the credit-trading group, is Q B .  The market
clearing price is p B .  We assume  .   pB< pA
Figure 4 (b)  illustrates the effect of integrating the markets.  The effective supply of
permits and credits  is  .  The demand of Group A is plotted from the origin in the QT’QA%QB
normal manner.  The demand of Group B is plotted in a leftwards direction from Q T .  The
equilibrium price is  , with E A  permits and credits in the hands of Group A and the remainder,  pT
 in the hands of Group B.  On the assumptions of the example, the equilibrium price in QB’ET&QA
the combined market lies between the prices in the two markets operating separately and the
quantity-controlled Group A is a net purchaser of credits from Group B.
Notice that in this scenario it is possible for all Group B firms to be net suppliers of credits. 
 Thus Proposition 4 does not hold in the case of integrated cap-and-trade and ERC credit trading
markets and it becomes credible to speak of ERCs being generated by reductions in excess of
regulatory requirements without simultaneously permitting other firms to fall short of theirs.
These results are not surprising.  What does bear emphasis, however, is that as the output12
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of the Group B firms increases, the price in the integrated market will asymptotically approach the
price in the ERC market, that is,   will become arbitrarily close to  .  This is shown in Figure pT pB
4(b) by an increase in Group B’s output from  to  .  As described earlier, this causes the QB Q
)
B
effective demand for emission to rotate counter-clockwise about the vertical intercept.  When this
new curve is plotted on panel (b) it is seen that the price of permits declines. 
 Under these circumstances the cap-and-trade plan is essentially vitiated.  Firms in Group A
face an effective tax of    on emissions, with a free base equal to their original permit pB
distributions.  They are disadvantaged relative to the firms in Group B in that their free base does
not increase as output increases.   There is no long-run constraint on aggregate emissions.  
Conclusions
We have examined the differences between traditional cap-and-trade permit trading and
open-market emissions reduction credit trading.  The two methods lead to identical results when
output is fixed.  Short run cost efficience is guaranteed because firms equate their marginal
abatement costs to the price of permits or credits.  When output increases, however,  the effective
supply of emissions remains constant under permit trading but increases under ERC trading.  Thus 
the price of ERCs will tend to remain constant over time.  Like an emissions tax,  ERC trading
achieves an efficient allocation of abatement responsibilities without a quantitative limit on
aggregate emissions.   In fact we have shown that open-market ERC trading is equivalent to an
emissions tax with a free base equal to the prescribed emissions ratio times current output.  This in
turn implies that long run average cost is lower and industry output higher under ERC trading than
under a comparable tax.  
We have shown that a pure ERC trading plan will not generate trades if firms are given
prescribed emissions ratios equal to current, unregulated practice.  When integrated with a cap-
and-trade system, however, an ERC system may be expected to expand the effective supply of
emissions and to lower their price.  As the ERC sector grows, the cap in the conventional ERC
system becomes increasingly ineffective and the price of permits approaches the price of credits in
a stand-alone ERC plan.  13
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The choice between ERC and permit trading is thus similar to the choice between price and
quantity instruments.  In a world of certainty and exogenously determined output levels, the
instruments have equivalent results, so the choice should probably be made so as to minimize
administrative,  monitoring and enforcement costs.  When output is endogenous, it should be
recognized that over time an ERC plan will lead to higher emissions and lower marginal abatement
costs than would a cap-and-trade plan.  In choosing between instruments policy makers should
consider which pattern of marginal abatement cost changes are most likely to track changes in
marginal damages.   In a world of uncertainty, there may be still more to be said.   When there is
uncertainty about abatement costs, Weizman (1974) has shown that price instruments are to be
preferred when the marginal damage function is flat relative to the abatement cost function.   It
seems reasonable to propose that ERC trading is particularly well suited to similar markets. 
The effectiveness of ERC trading depends on imposing an average performance standard
sufficiently strong to equate the price of credits to the marginal damage caused by emissions.  This
will not happen if  participants are given “business-as-usual” performance standards.  Such
generous standards will progressively undermine any social value in emissions trading.  This may
be a major problem in the context of the “clean development mechanism” in the Kyoto Agreement. 
The CDM is designed to generate emission reduction credits which can be applied to the
quantitative limits undertaken by the Annex B countries.  There is a strong tendency for
proponents of the CDM to advocate rapid deployment of projects with generous baselines for
creation of credits.  In sufficient quantity, such projects have the potential for driving the price of
permits to zero and vitiating the Kyoto protocol entirely.  A similar danger appears in the PERT
and GERT pilot emissions reductions credit trading plans.  Trades undertaken under these
programs seem to imply a “business-as-usual” performance standard.  Unless stronger standards
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Figure 1 .   Determination of the market price of
ERCs.  The supply of credits is the output-weighted
sum of individual performance standards.  The demand
is the output-weighted sum of unit demands for
emissions.  Proportionate growth in output shifts






Figure 2 .  Emissions Ratios and Efficiency.   The firm’s demand for emissions per unit of
output,  , is the inverse of the unit marginal abatement cost curve.  These are weighted by r i( pz)
industry output shares to obtain the market demand for emissions per unit of output,




market demand for emissions per unit of output with the output-weighted prescribed emission













unit of output, saving area  a+b  in  abatement costs per unit of output  and earning a profit equal
to area   b per unit of output.19
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Figure 3 .   Long Run Supply Curves .  Differing regulatory
regimes generate different long run supply curves.  The supply
curve under an emissions tax,  S 1 , is horizontal at  .  The ci%tri
supply curve under emissions reductions trading, S 2 , is
horizontal at a lower price,  .  The supply curve ci%t( ri&¯ri)
under command and control perfomance standards, S 3,  is
horizontal at  . S 3  lies above S 2  .  The supply curve under ci
cap-and-trade emissions trading, S 4 , is sloped because the
price of permits rises as industry output increases. S 4  is
positively sloped for net purchasers of permits, negatively





Figure 4 .   Integrating cap-and-trade and ERC trading.   The top graphs represent
independent cap-and-trade and ERC markets.  Combining them leads to a price between the
stand-alone prices and allows the emissions of one group to expand.  Here, the emissions trading
group purchases  credits from the ERC trading group.  Over time, the output of the ERC EA&QA
trading group increases, rotating  the effective supply of permits and credits counter-clockwise.
Applying the new graph to panel (b) shows that the integrated price falls and approaches the
price in the stand-alone ERC market.  22
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Figure 5 .   Determination of the market price of
ERCs.  The supply of credits is the output-weighted
sum of individual performance standards.  The demand
is the output-weighted sum of unit demands for
emissions.  Proportionate growth in output shifts






Figure 6 .  Emissions Ratios and Efficiency.   The firm’s demand for emissions per unit of
output,  , is the inverse of the unit marginal abatement cost curve.  These are weighted by r i( pz)
industry output shares to obtain the market demand for emissions per unit of output,




market demand for emissions per unit of output with the output-weighted prescribed emission













unit of output, saving area  a+b  in  abatement costs per unit of output  and earning a profit equal
to area   b per unit of output.25
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Figure 7 .   Long Run Supply Curves .  Differing regulatory
regimes generate different long run supply curves.  The supply
curve under an emissions tax,  S 1 , is horizontal at  .  The ci%tri
supply curve under emissions reductions trading, S 2 , is
horizontal at a lower price,  .  The supply curve ci%t( ri&¯ri)
under command and control perfomance standards, S 3,  is
horizontal at  . S 3  lies above S 2  .  The supply curve under ci
cap-and-trade emissions trading, S 4 , is sloped because the
price of permits rises as industry output increases. S 4  is
positively sloped for net purchasers of permits, negatively





Figure 8 .   Integrating cap-and-trade and ERC trading.   The top graphs represent
independent cap-and-trade and ERC markets.  Combining them leads to a price between the
stand-alone prices and allows the emissions of one group to expand.  Here, the emissions trading
group purchases  credits from the ERC trading group.  Over time, the output of the ERC EA&QA
trading group increases, rotating  the effective supply of permits and credits counter-clockwise.
Applying the new graph to panel (b) shows that the integrated price falls and approaches the
price in the stand-alone ERC market.  28
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Figure 9 .   Determination of the market price of
ERCs.  The supply of credits is the output-weighted
sum of individual performance standards.  The demand
is the output-weighted sum of unit demands for
emissions.  Proportionate growth in output shifts






Figure 10 .  Emissions Ratios and Efficiency.   The firm’s demand for emissions per unit of
output,  , is the inverse of the unit marginal abatement cost curve.  These are weighted by r i( pz)
industry output shares to obtain the market demand for emissions per unit of output,




market demand for emissions per unit of output with the output-weighted prescribed emission













unit of output, saving area  a+b  in  abatement costs per unit of output  and earning a profit equal
to area   b per unit of output.31
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Figure 11 .   Long Run Supply Curves .  Differing regulatory
regimes generate different long run supply curves.  The supply
curve under an emissions tax,  S 1 , is horizontal at  .  The ci%tri
supply curve under emissions reductions trading, S 2 , is
horizontal at a lower price,  .  The supply curve ci%t( ri&¯ri)
under command and control perfomance standards, S 3,  is
horizontal at  . S 3  lies above S 2  .  The supply curve under ci
cap-and-trade emissions trading, S 4 , is sloped because the
price of permits rises as industry output increases. S 4  is
positively sloped for net purchasers of permits, negatively
sloped for net sellers of permits.  32
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Figure 12 .   Integrating cap-and-trade and ERC trading.   The top graphs represent
independent cap-and-trade and ERC markets.  Combining them leads to a price between the
stand-alone prices and allows the emissions of one group to expand.  Here, the emissions trading
group purchases  credits from the ERC trading group.  Over time, the output of the ERC EA&QA
trading group increases, rotating  the effective supply of permits and credits counter-clockwise.
Applying the new graph to panel (b) shows that the integrated price falls and approaches the
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